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Miller: "Don't Be Evil": Gmail's Relevant Text Advertisements Violate Goo

NOTE
"DON'T BE EVIL": GMAIL'S RELEVANT TEXT
ADVERTISEMENTS VIOLATE GOOGLE'S OWN
MOTTO AND YOUR E-MAIL PRIVACY RIGHTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

An attorney presses "send" on an e-mail message to a prospective
client following an initial consultation. The prospective client has an email account with Google's recently introduced webmail service, Gmail.
What the attorney does not know is that before his e-mail reaches its
intended audience, Google will have scanned the contents of the
message, found within it words and phrases such as "new client,"
"attorneys at law," "construction litigation," and even the name of the
city in which the attorney practices, and placed along side the e-mail,

contemporaneously with the client's viewing of it, advertisements for
legal services offered by the attorney's competitors. This seemingly
hypothetical scenario is actually an everyday occurrence that is all too

real. 1

1. In fact, when this author composed and sent such an e-mail, two of the three contentsensitive advertisements Gmail placed alongside the body of the e-mail listed the author's
competitors:
Dear Mr. Jones:
It was a pleasure meeting with you yesterday in our offices. I will be preparing and
mailing today the retainer agreement for your review and signature. Please do not
hesitate to give me a call at the office should you have any questions or concerns. Once
again, I look forward to having you as a new client and helping you with your complex
construction matter.
Jason Isaac Miller
Miller & Hofstra, LLP
Attorneys at Law
Hempstead, NY
Gmail then placed the following three advertisements and accompanying links to the right of the email:
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The introduction of Gmail in April 2004 marked the first time
relevant text advertisements were placed in e-mails, 2 making possible
this scenario, which was unheard of until then. While Google, the leader
in Internet search technology, 3 has been stirring up a frenzy with its
offering of invite-only e-mail accounts with huge storage capacity and4
search functionality, Google's competitors are rushing to catch up.
Logic and progress dictate that the technology powering Gmail's e-mail
scanning software will soon be employed by such widely used webmail
providers as Yahoo, Hotmail, and AOL.
Therefore, it is necessary to step back to evaluate, as early as
possible, whether e-mail users are trading their statutorily protected
privacy rights for bigger inboxes and whether non-subscribers who send

Helder Law Firm
Construction litigation and arbitration trial lawyer
www.helderlaw.com
Construction Litigation
Litigation consulting and expert testimony for construction disputes
www.interface-consulting.com
New York Construction Law
Kushnick & Assoc. P.C. Law Construction, Commercial Litigation
www.nyconstructionlaw.com
more sponsored links )
E-mail from Jason Isaac Miller, "attorney" and non-Gmail user to "Mr. Jones," potential client, and
Gmail user (June 20, 2005, 20:26 EST) (on file with author).
2. See Katie Hafner, In Google We Trust? When the Subject is E-Mail, Maybe Not, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at G1.
3. See CNET News.com Staff, Google Pushes to Stay King of the Hill, CNET NEWS.COM,
Feb. 8, 2005, http://news.com.com/Google+pushes+to+stay+king+of+the+hill/2009-1032_35567569.html. Google has been considered the search engine "leader" since early 2001. See
Stephanie Olson, Search Start-ups Seek Google's Throne, CNET NEWS.CoM, Aug. 28, 2001,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-272230.html.
4.
Google's entry in April with a beta service that provides 1 Gigabyte of storage for free
led competitors to rush to increase their storage limits and to refresh their features and
services.
Both Yahoo and MSN Hotmail upped their storage limits to 250 megabytes for free
accounts and 2 gigabytes for paid accounts. Yahoo also acquired e-mail startups Oddpost
Inc. and Stata Laboratories Inc. earlier [in 2004].
Matt Hicks, AOL Readies Web E-Mail Contender, EWEEK.coM, Dec. 22, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1745129,00.asp; see Saul Hansell, Yahoo Expands E-Mail
Storage, in Nod to Google, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at Cl; see also infra notes 11-17 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Gmail's April 1, 2005 100% increase in storage and the
struggle of competitors to catch up.
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e-mail messages to Gmail users are unknowingly allowing their privacy
rights to be violated.
This Note contends that the statutory exception allowing electronic
communications service providers like Gmail to intercept, process, and
utilize e-mail intended for its users for advertising and revenue
generating purposes is too broad. While this exception allows for
electronic communication service providers to scan the contents of emails in order to offer their users services generally accepted as
convenient and beneficial-such as virus protection and spell
checking-the practice of text advertisement placement is
distinguishable. The placement of these advertisements differs from
services currently offered to e-mail users in that virus protection and
spell checking features do not directly generate revenue for e-mail
service providers. Moreover, unlike virus protection and spell checking,
the placement of relevant text advertisements may adversely affect the
non-subscriber who sends e-mail to a Gmail user in the manner
described above. 5 E-mail forwarding 6 has become a widely used practice
due to the number of individuals who maintain multiple e-mail accounts
(for business, school, and personal purposes). My hypothetical attorney
may very well send the potential client an e-mail message to the client's
business or personal e-mail address, unaware of the fact that the
confidential communiqud will be automatically forwarded to and
eventually scanned by the client's Gmail account. Aside from inquiring
about his potential client's e-mail practices, the attorney would have no
way of knowing that his e-mail message would be intercepted and
scanned before the potential client receives it.
Part II of this Note will answer the question "what is Gmail?" and
examine the technology and processes behind the placement of relevant
text advertisements. Part III will examine the current statutory
protections covering electronic communications under the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act ("ECPA").7 Part IV will briefly survey the

5. See Hafner, supra note 2.
6.
Email Forwarding
Maybe you have a large number of email addresses and don't want to check all of them
separately. With the email forwarding feature, you can forward all your incoming email
to another email address that you specify. This is similar to forwarding for your phone
calls. You can easily set up your email forwarding or change it through your website
control panel.
Terms and Glossary, http://www.sklservices.com/glossary.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
7. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2005)).
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evolution of federal case law that addresses the interception of e-mail
and the interpretation and the applicability of the provisions of the
ECPA. Part V will examine the main problems associated with the
current application of the ECPA as interpreted by the courts: the
prevailing reasoning behind the most recent Court of Appeals cases is
flawed; and under that reasoning, courts are likely to find Gmail is not
intercepting e-mail intended for its users; and the Stored Communication
Act's ("SCA") Electronic Communications Service Provider exception
is too broad as currently written, thereby allowing Gmail to intercept its
users' e-mails and encroach on statutorily protected Internet privacy
expectations. Part VI will address these problems by proposing solutions
and discussing their instrumental effects. These proposals include an
alternate statutory mechanism for protection of both wire and electronic
communications that is consistent with legislative intent; an alternate
judicial interpretation that eviscerates the distinction between the
protection afforded electronic communications that are in storage and
those that are not; and an alternative statutory exception for electronic
communications service providers which is broad enough to allow such
actors to engage in the functions necessary to provide communications
services to the public, while at the same time prohibiting e-mail
providers like Gmail from sifting through the content of e-mail sent by
unknowing parties intended for Gmail users. Finally, Part VII will
conclude by suggesting that one of the above remedies, if not all, is
necessary to curb the encroachment on Internet privacy by Gmail, which
is in a unique position to abuse its power.

II.

GMAIL: A DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY

A.

What is Gmail?

Founded in September 1998 by Larry Page and Sergey Brin,
Google Inc. is the developer of the award-winning Google search
engine, which is designed to search the Internet for information in an
easy, efficient manner.8 Offering users access to an index comprising
more than eight billion web pages, Google is the largest search engine
on the Internet 9 and maintains its leadership position in the search
8. See
Google
Press
Center:
Google
Inc.
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.google.com/int/en/press/facts.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
9. Id. Google.com is available in 100 languages and it accepts payments for advertisements
in forty-eight currencies. See Kevin Couglin, Google Searchesfor Everything on Earth, THE STAR
LEDGER, May 20, 2005, at 47.
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industry l ° by continually innovating its search capabilities. On April 1,
2004, Google announced the addition of Gmail" to its array of online
search-related services. 12 Gmail is a free, search-based webmail service
that provides over two and a half gigabytes of webmail storage in
exchange for content-sensitive advertising that appears on the right side
of the user's computer screen when the user accesses e-mail.' 3 While
Gmail offers many innovative features, Google explains, "[t]he
backbone of Gmail is a powerful Google search engine that quickly
finds any message an account owner has ever sent or received. That
' 4
,1
means there's no need to file messages in order to find them again.
This search functionality, together with an attractive two gigabyte
storage limit, an industry first, 5 and other nifty innovations such as

10. "On Tuesday, March 23, 2004, WebSideStory examined a sample of over twenty-five
million visits and found that Google had the top share of search referrals, 40.9 percent. It was
followed by Yahoo at 27.4 percent, then MSN at 19.6 percent." Danny Sullivan, Google Tops, but
Yahoo
Switch
Success
so
Far,
SEARCHENGINEWATCH,
Apr.
5,
2004,
http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/article.php/3334881.
1I. Lisa Baertlein, Google: 'Gmail'No Joke, but LunarJobs are, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-04-01-gmail-no-joke x.htm.
12. These include: Google.com, Google Alerts, Google Answers, Google Catalogs, Google
Directory, Froogle, Google Groups, Google Images, Google Labs, Google Local, Google Maps,
Google Mobile, Google News, Google Print, Google Scholar, Google Special Searches, Google
University Search, Blogger, Google Code, Google Desktop Search, Hello, Keyhole, Picasa, Google
Toolbar, Google Translate, and Urchin. For a description of each, see Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
13. See
About
Gmail,
It
has
Ads.
But
Only
Good
Ads,
http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/whygmail.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). Gmail refers to
these advertisements as "relevant text advertisements." Id.
14. About Gmail: What is Gmail?, http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/about.html (last visited
Mar.
28,
2005).
To
view
screenshots
of
search
capabilities,
see
http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/screen3.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
15. On April 1, 2005, Gmail's one-year anniversary, Google doubled the amount of storage
offered on its free e-mail service to a very attractive two gigabytes. See Bloomberg News, Google
Doubling Storage on Free E-Mail Service, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at C3. Google further
announced that it would continue to increase e-mail storage in the next few weeks. Id. This author
currently maintains a Gmail account with a free storage capacity of 2.561 gigabytes. Once again,
competitors have been rushing to catch up in response to Gmail's new two gigabyte increase. In
June 2005, AOL began giving away most of its popular online services free of charge on its
AOL.com website. See Hiawatha Bray, You 've Got Freebies as AOL Opens Up. No. 1 Internet
ProviderStarts Giving Away Most of its PopularServices, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 2005, at Dl.
"AOL.com in the past hasn't been thought of as a place to come for great content for
free," said Kerry Parkins, director of product marketing for America Online. But Parkins
said this will change in the next few months, as AOL moves nearly all of its features
away from the company's exclusive subscription service and onto a Web portal that will
challenge major free websites like ...Google ....
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"conversation threads" 16 has helped create a worldwide race to sign up
17
for Gmail accounts.
B. Relevant Text Advertisements. How do They Work?
Privacy and civil liberties organizations as well as individuals have
been raising concerns about Gmail's placement of relevant text
advertisements in e-mails since the service was first announced in April,
2004.18 When the user is logged into his Gmail account, Google will
display targeted advertisements and other relevant information based on
the content of the e-mail message displayed.19 In a completely automated
process, computers process the entire content of the e-mail message,
including the header and address information, perform a mathematical
analysis on it, and finally match the message to advertisements or other
related information in Google's extensive database. 20 Google asserts in
its privacy policy that no humans are involved in this process, 2' and that
no e-mail content or other personally identifiable information will be
provided to advertisers.22
Advertisements are matched using the same technology that powers
the Google Adsense program, which already places targeted
advertisements on thousands of sites across the web by quickly
16. This feature strings together related e-mail messages, arranging them in conversation
threads. The threads allow users to view e-mails messages and their responses as an entire
conversation chain rather than as individual messages. See Getting Started With Gmail,
http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/start.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
17. See Juliet Chung, For Some Beta Testers, It's About Buzz, Not Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2004, at GI (discussing the popularity of Gmail beta test accounts). Obtaining a Gmail account
continues to be an invitation-only affair, consequently, having a Gmail e-mail address currently
carries with it a bit of prestige and conveys a message of e-sophistication. See Don Fernandez, PreEminent Domain: These Days, Some Folks on the Internet are Judging Us by Our E-mail
Addresses, ATL. JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 28, 2005, at FI ("'The Gmail domain.., lets me

know someone spends a lot of time online ...[while on the other hand] [wihen I see a Yahoo or
Hotmail domain I think not only cheap, but also disposable... [a]nd I think 'dumbo' when I see
someone nowadays with an AOL account."' Id.Slightly more than three million Americans now
boast a Gmail account. Id.As of April 2005, only a year after its inception, Gmail has become the
fourth-most-visited e-mail service on the Web, only behind industry standards Yahoo, AOL, and
MSN's Hotmail. See Bloomberg News, supra note 15.
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Thirty-One Privacy and Civil
Liberties Organizations Urge Google to Suspend Gmail .(Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GmailLetter.htm.
19. See About Gmail, What is Gmail?, supranote 14.
20. See Gmail Privacy Policy, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html; see also About
Gmail, It has Ads. But Only Good Ads, supra note 13.
21. See Gmail Privacy Policy, supra note 20.
22. See Gmail Terms of Use, http://gmail.google.com/gmailhelp/terms-of use.html (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005), at sec. 8.
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analyzing the content of web pages and determining which
advertisements are most relevant to them.23 The placement of relevant
text advertisements in Gmail 24is mandatory, and users may not opt out of
receiving the advertisements.
Although Google has not released technical details of how Gmail's
"content extraction" and analysis work, the patents filed with the US
Patent and Trademark Office provide some clues. 25 "From a technical
23. About
Gmail,
Are
There
Advertisements
in
Gmail?,
http://gmail.google.corm/gmail/help/about.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). In May 2004, Google
co-founder Sergey Brin was asked about how advertisements would be placed on Gmail and
specifically what dangers might be posed by the targeted advertising made possible by its relevant
text advertisements. The following hypothetical scenario was posed to Brin in an interview:
[A]n anti-gay group buys Gmail ads that are targeted at people whose email reveals them
to be gay. When these gay people click through the targeted ads, they land on the antigay website, which allows the website owners to log their IP addresses-and since IP
addresses are often traceable to real-world addresses, the anti-gay group could possibly
use targeted Gmail ads to compile a hit list of gay people, complete with directions to
their ... homes.

Annalee Newitz, Datapocalypse: Google's Webmail Service is Just the Beginning of a New
Information
Surveillance
Regime,
METRO,
May
5,
2004,
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/05.05.04/gmail-0419.html. Brin responded by saying he
would not let this scenario come to pass:
First of all, you can't buy an ad for Gmail alone ...[w]e have tens of thousand of
websites to put ads on, and we don't let advertisers target specific ones. But also, we
don't want an advertiser to have specific ads that will be matched with Latinos or
another group somehow. We wanted to prevent that, because we were careful about
privacy from the outset. We require that an ad match broadly and run broadly.
Id.Yet, less than a year later, Brin and Google went back on their promise, giving in to the demands
of advertisers when it announced a limited beta feature for AdWords allowing advertisers to target
their advertisements to thousands of specific content sites across the Interet. See Google Tests
Cost-Per-ImpressionPricing and Targeting for AdWords, SEARCH ENGINE LOWDOWN, Apr. 25,
2005, http://www.searchenginelowdown.com/2005/04/google-tests-cost-per-impression.htmi.
For
the first time, AdWords advertisers will be able to select which specific web sites their
advertisements are displayed on. Id. Furthermore, the new format will, for the first time, allow for
animated image advertisements on Google. See Saul Hansel, Google to Sell Ads Not Related to
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at Cl; see also Google Advertising,
http://www.google.com/ads/imageads/index.htnl (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). This will be a change
for Google, which is known for, and recognized by, its clean, crisp appearance with text
advertisements only. See Newitz, supra. While the new targeted advertisements do not appear on
Gmail, if Google continues to change their policies annually, it may be only a matter of time before
advertisers will be able to place their targeted advertisements on Gmail alone. See All About SiteTargetedAds, at http://www.google.com/ads/sitetargeted.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
24. See Gmail Terms of Use, supra note 22. In April 2005, Google announced that AdSense
revenues had risen 75%, helping Google to increase their revenues 93% since 2003. See Profits
Soar at Google as AdSense Revenues Rise 75%, REVOLUTIONMAGAZINE, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.revolutionmagazine.com/news/index.cfm?fuseaction=ViewNewsArticle&newslD=4720
07.
25. Google has filed three different patents:
Advertisers are permitted to put targeted ads on e-mails. The present invention may do
so by (i) obtaining information of an e-mail that includes available spots for ads, (ii)
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standpoint, there is no categorical difference between Google's 'content
extraction' and spain filtering-each involves an automated process that
analyzes the body and/or header information of e-mail messages. 26
However, from a legal and privacy standpoint, there is a fundamental
difference between filtering unwanted junk e-mail and analyzing the
content of private communications in order to target paid advertisements
to generate revenue. 27 Still, as long as it is a computer, and not a person
reading your e-mail, many ask, why all the fuss? In response, some
contend that having a person read your e-mail to target the
advertisements would be less of a privacy invasion.28 Unlike large
computer systems, a human's storage, memory, and associative capacity
is finite. But Google has the ability to build profiles of users based on
their communications, unhindered by the unrestrictive Gmail Privacy
Policy. 29 "Additionally, Gmail's 'context extraction' will make its
privacy invasions continuous and automated, making it a difficult
both of which
privacy problem to solve just as spam and telemarketing,
30
computer."
by
automated
and
are also continuous
determining one or more ads relevant to the e-mail information, and/or (iii) providing the
one or more ads for rendering in association with the e-mail.
U.S. Patent Application No. 20040059712 (filed June 2, 2003).
The relevance of advertisements to a user's interests is improved. In one implementation,
the content of a web page is analyzed to determine a list of one or more topics associated
with that webpage. An advertisement is considered to be relevant to that webpage if it is
associated with keywords belonging to the list of one or more topics, One or more of
these relevant text advertisements may be provided for rendering in conjunction with the
web page or related web pages.
U.S. Patent Application No. 20040059708 (filed Dec. 6, 2002).
Advertisers are permitted to put targeted ads on page on the web (or some other
document of any media type). The present invention may do so by (i) obtaining content
that includes available spots for ads, (ii) determining ads relevant to content, and/or (iii)
combining content with ads determined to be relevant to the content.
U.S. Patent Application No. 20040093327 (filed Feb. 26, 2003).
26. See Gmail Privacy Page, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/gmail/faq.html, at see. 2.4 (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
27. See id. (distinguishing between spain filtering and Gmail's practices).
28. See id. at sec. 2.5.
29. See id.
30. Id.Privacy advocates have pointed out troubling gaps in Gmail's Privacy Policy,
especially relating to the threat of unlimited data retention. For example, see the Electronic Privacy
Information Center's Gmail Privacy Page where it is warned that:
While the prospect of never having to delete or file an e-mail is an attractive feature for
space-hungry users, the implications of indefinite storage of e-mail communications
presents several serious implications. Although Google has [sic] is held in high esteem
by the public as a good corporate citizen, past performance is no guarantee of future
behavior-especially following Google's IPO when the company will have a legal duty
to maximize shareholder wealth. Although Google currently says that they will not
record the "concepts" extracted from scanned e-mails, they could decide to do so in the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/12

8

Miller: "Don't Be Evil": Gmail's Relevant Text Advertisements Violate Goo

2005]

GMAIL AND RELEVANT TEXTADVERTISEMENTS

III.

CURRENT LAW: STATUTORY PROTECTION OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS

A.

Omnibus Crime ControlandSafe Streets Act of 1968

Congress first addressed the need to protect privacy in the context
of evolving technology by introducing Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act,3' commonly known as the Federal Wiretap

Act.32 The enactment of Title III was significant because Congress
recognized that technological developments enabled the interception of
personal and commercial communications.33 Title III, however, was
limited in scope,34 as it only prohibited the interception of
communications that could be heard and understood by humans as
sound.35 Thus, there was no Title III protection against the interception
of "text, digital or machine communication" because in these sources of
communication, there are no audible sounds to intercept.36 In addition,
the act of interception was narrowly construed under the language of the
statute to include only the contemporaneous acquisition of the
communication,37 thereby affording inadequate protection.38

future and thereby create detailed profiles of users. Building such profiles on years of
past communication in addition to current communications is made easier if users never
delete e-mails. Additionally, communications stored for more than 180 days are exposed
to lower protections from law enforcement access; with Gmail, many such e-mails could
be made easily available to police.
Id. at sec. 1.3(b); but cf Grant Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail!, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0014,
34-36, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005ditr0014.html (concluding that Gmail's
practices and procedures are consistent with the standards of the webmail industry, and that Google
is a business, which through Gmail provides a service, and in return "should be allowed to display
its ads based on trigger words in the text.").
31. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (Supp. V 19651969)).
32. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Tit. III, 82 Stat. 212
(1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2005)).
33. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 10 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2156.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99-22, at 17 (1986) (stating that Congress "did not attempt to
address the interception of text, digital or machine communication").
35. See id
36. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977) (holding that pen
registers do not intercept because they do not acquire the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device).
37. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99-22, at 17 (1986) (recognizing that these forms of
communication were not as common as telephone communication or face-to-face oral
communication).
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By the mid-1980s, the telecommunications landscape had changed
dramatically from the landscape that existed when Title III was first
enacted. 39 Technology had outpaced the privacy protections in Title III,
creating uncertainty and gaps in its protections. 40 To remedy these
perceived weaknesses and to update and expand the privacy protections
in the 1968 Act,4 ' Congress passed the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986.42
The ECPA was divided into Title I, commonly known as the
Wiretap Act, 43 and Title II, commonly known as the Stored
Communications Act. 44 The amendments provided for the protection of

electronic communications along with oral and wire communications.4 5
B.

Title I of the ECPA: The Wiretap Act

101(c)(1)(A) of the ECPA added "electronic
Section
communications" to the existing prohibitions against intercepting wire
and oral communications. 46 The amended Wiretap Act provides a private
39. See id. at 17-18 (stating that pre-ECPA Title III failed to anticipate the advent of "text,
digital or machine communication" and the increasing use of communications that are not routed
through communications common carriers, such as e-mail, videotex, and other private services).
40.
Although it is still not twenty years old, the Wiretap Act was written in a different
technological era ... Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations ... and a

dazzling array of digitized information networks which were little more than concepts
two decades ago. Unfortunately, the same technologies that hold such promise for the
future also enhance the risk that our communications will be intercepted by either private
parties or the government.
Id. at 17-18. The legislative history surrounding the 1986 Act refers to the "dazzling array of
digitized information networks", however, to put that phrase into proper perspective, the ECPA was
drafted in an era when only 50,000 computers were connected to the Internet. See Electronic
Communications Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Just. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986)
(statement of Chairman Robert Kastenmeier); see also Raechel V. Groom, In re Pharmatrak &
Theofel v. Farey-Jones: Recent Applications of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 455, 456 (2004). The Internet now allows millions of people to communicate
and exchange information through an international network of interconnected computers. See Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997).
41. See SEN. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. "The
bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies." Id.
42. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (1994)).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1986).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1986).
45. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C.
46. See Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and
Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1,39 (2003).
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right of action against one who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication. 47 Congress
defined an electronic communication in part as "any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce," but excluded wire and oral communications from the
definition.48
Plaintiffs must show five elements to make their claim under Title I
of the ECPA: A defendant (1) intentionally; (2) intercepted, endeavored
to intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept; (3) the contents of; (4) an electronic communication; (5) using
a device. 49 This showing is subject to certain statutory exceptions,
including consent. 50 "Consent may be explicit or5 implied, but it must be
'
actual consent rather than constructive consent."
Act 52
C. Title H of the ECPA: The Stored Communications
Congress also realized that with the proliferation of large databanks
of stored electronic communications in every facet of society, threats to
individual privacy extended well beyond the bounds of the Wiretap
Act's prohibition against the "interception" of communications.53

47. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2005) (providing a private
right of action).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000). In addition to altering the substantive prohibition by adding
electronic communications to the list of covered communications, Congress also altered the
definition of "intercept." As amended, the statute defined "intercept" as "the aural or other
acquisition" of the contents of a communication, thereby clarifying that electronic communications
need not be "aurally" acquired. Id. at § 2510(4).
49. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
50.
(d) It shall not be unlawful ... for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a
wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2000).
51. See Pharmatrak,329 F.3d at 23-24 (quoting Williams v. Poulos, II F.3d 271, 281-82 (1st
Cir. 1993)). Consent "should not be casually inferred." See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112,
117-18 (lst Cir. 1990).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (1986).
53. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 206 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., dissenting)
(discussing Congressional intent behind the ECPA). The Wiretap Act had already been interpreted
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Therefore, the stored communications provisions were intended to
address "the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately
gaining access to, or sometimes tampering with, [stored] electronic or
wire communications. 5 4 The 1986 SCA also provides protection for
private communications, barring unauthorized access to an electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage. 55 The SCA provides in
relevant part with certain exceptions,56 that there is a criminal or civil

cause of action against one who: "(1) intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system., 57 The statute further provides, "a person or
entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents
of a
58
communication while in electronic storage by that service.
Congress intended for the privacy protections established by the
SCA to apply to two categories of communications: "those associated
with transmission and incident thereto" and those of "a back-up
variety., 59 The first category refers to temporary storage such as when a
message sits in an e-mail user's mailbox after transmission but prior to
the user retrieving the message from the mail server. 60 However, this
category does not include messages that are still in transmission, which
remain covered by the Wiretap Act.61 The second category includes
communications that are retained on a server for administrative and
billing purposes. 62 Electronic "communications service providers could

to only prohibit "the contemporaneous acquisition of [a] communication." See United States v.
Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
54. See SEN. REP. No. 99-541, at 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3589.
Congress concluded that "the information [in these communications] may be open to possible
wrongful use and public disclosure by law enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private
parties." Id. at 3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.

55. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
56. See discussion infra Part VI.C. and accompanying footnotes.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2004). This Note is especially concerned with this prohibition as it
relates to Gmail in its capacity as a provider of electronic communication services to the public.
59. H.R. REP. No. 647, 99-22, at 68 (1986).
60. See id.
at 65.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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use stored messages in this category to restore a user's data in the event
of a system crash or to recover [an] accidentally-deleted message[]. 63
D. The USA PATRIOTAct
The USA PATRIOT Act 64 was enacted on October 26, 2001 and
has played an important role in the history of the ECPA by repealing the
express inclusion of stored wire communications from the definition of
wire communication. 65 This change was significant because the opinions
of Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service; Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. and United States v. Councilman previously
rested on this textual distinction when they held that the definition of
"intercept," in the context of electronic communications, requires
contemporaneity. 66 Furthermore, the Konop and Steiger67 opinions
interpreted this congressional amendment to reflect intent to reinstate the
pre-ECPA definition of "intercept"-acquisition contemporaneous with
transmission-with respect to wire communications.6 8 The idea that
Congress implicitly approved the judicial definition of "intercept" as
requiring contemporaneity rests on the courts' assumption that Congress
was aware of the narrow definition courts had previously given the term
with respect to the unchanged definition of "electronic
communications. 6 9
IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
"INTERCEPT" UNDER THE ECPA

Although Congress redefined the term "intercept" in 1986 to clarify
that communications need not be "aurally" acquired,70 it did not address
63. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 207 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
64. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act], 115 Stat. 272
§ 209, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2001).
66. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048 (11 th Cit. 2003).
67. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (1lth Cir. 2003).
68. Id.at 1048-49; Konop, 302 F.3d at 878; see also Christopher T. Blackford, Comment,
Judicial Interpretations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Raise Concerns About
Whether the Airline Industries' On-Line Business Ventures areProtected,68 J. AIR L. & COM. 819,

849 (2003).
69. See Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49; Konop, 302 F.3d at 878.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000). The ECPA defines the term "intercept" as "the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic mechanical, or other device." Id.
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the contemporaneity issue directly. Consequently, courts, relying on
other statutory clues, have concluded that an electronic communication
is only intercepted when it is seized during its transmission. 71 The
following cases detail the evolution of the case law among the circuits
that led to this conclusion.
A.

United States v. Turk

Prior to the ECPA, United States v. Turk72 created a narrow
interpretation of "interception" under the Wiretap Act. 73 Even after the
passage of the ECPA, circuits continue to rely on Turk and decisions
from others circuits that have adopted its reasoning under the framework
of the post-ECPA, Federal Wiretap Act. 74 In United States v. Turk,
police officers removed a tape recorder and two cassette tapes from a car
during an arrest for cocaine possession. 75 The officers listened to the
tapes at the station house.7 6 The court noted that "[the officers] soon
realized that they were listening.., to a recording of a private telephone
conversation ... [but t]he officers continued to listen out of
'curiosity."'' 77 The court decided the issue of "[w]hether the seizure and
replaying of the cassette tape by the officers was also an 'interception"'
under the original Federal Wiretap Act.78
The court held that the seizure and replaying of the tapes was not an
interception prohibited under the original Federal Wiretap Act because
an interception "require[d] participation by the one charged with an
'interception' in the contemporaneous acquisition of the communication
through the use of the device, 79 and the officers were not involved in
the recording of the tapes, but were merely listening to them after the

71. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003); Steve
Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 388 (D. Del. 1997);
Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996).
72. 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976).
73. See Tatsuya Akamine, Note, Proposalfor a FairStatutory Interpretation:E-mail Stored
in a Service Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L.
& POL'Y 519, 545 n.98 (1999).

74. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868
(9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994).
75. Turk, 526 F.2d at 656.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 656-57.
78. Id. at 657.
79. Id.at 658.
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fact. 80 In Turk, the court chose to base its interpretation of "interception"
on the legislative history of the statute rather than derive it from a strict
reading of the statutory language.81 In requiring the contemporaneity
element of an interception, the court equated the term "interception"
with "wiretapping," even though the latter was nowhere defined in the
statute.82 Subsequent cases that relied on Turk for the proposition that
contemporaneity is necessary in order for an interception under the
Wiretap Act failed to take into account that unlike a telephone
conversation, the contents of which are ephemeral and must be acquired
contemporaneously with its transmission, an un-read e-mail does not
require contemporaneity with its transmission.8 3 Unlike the fleeting
words of a telephone conversation, an unread e-mail remains perfectly
intact, a communication not yet completed, just as the contents of a
sealed letter are not yet communicated to its intended recipient. The
contents of the e-mail may readily be obtained at anytime. 84 While the
narrow definition of "intercept" which was first crafted by Turk is no
longer binding law, the reasoning behind it still carries great persuasive
force.85
B.

Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service

Relying on its own precedent in Turk, the Fifth Circuit erroneously
extended its reasoning concerning the wiretapping of telephone calls to
the interception of e-mail messages. 86 The plaintiff, Steve Jackson

80. Seeidat656.
81. See Akamine, supra note 73, at 543.
82. See id at 544.
83. See id.
84.
In a sense e-mail is like a letter. It is sent and lies sealed in the computer until the
recipient opens his or her computer and retrieves the transmission. The sender enjoys a
reasonable expectation that the initial transmission will not be intercepted by the police.
The fact that an unauthorized "hacker" might intercept an e-mail message does not
diminish the legitimate expectation of privacy in any way.
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1589
(2004) (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
85. When Turk was decided in 1976, the statutory definition of "wire communication" did not
yet include stored information. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 887 (9th Cir.
2002). Congress's amendment of § 25 10(1) to include stored information occurred ten years later, in
1986. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). To
the extent that Turk stands for a definition of "intercept" that requires contemporaneity, it has been
statutorily overruled, at least in the context of wire communications. See United States v. Smith, 155
F.3d 1051, 1057 n.Il (9th Cir. 1998).
86. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Games, Inc., published books, magazines, and games. The company
maintained an electronic bulletin board on one of its computers, where it
posted public information about its products. 8 This bulletin board also
permitted customers to send and receive private e-mail.8 9 E-mail
messages addressed to a customer were temporarily stored on the hard
drive of the computer supporting the bulletin board. Customers could
access the board from multiple locations and could choose to either store
messages on the plaintiff's hard drive or delete them after reading. 90 The
plaintiff alleged that the Secret Service seized and read these private
unread e-mail messages which were stored on plaintiffs computer. 91
The plaintiffs asked for damages as authorized by the Wiretap Act and
the SCA. 92 The district court awarded statutory damages under the SCA,
but denied relief under the Wiretap Act. 93 In affirming the district court,
the Fifth Circuit held that interception does not take place where a stored
it. 94
electronic transmission is seized before the intended recipient reads
The Fifth Circuit reached its decision by focusing on a key distinction
between the definitions of "wire communication" and "electronic
communication" as those terms are set forth in the Wiretap Act. 95 The
court pointed out that while the definition of "wire communication"
includes the electronic storage of a wire communication, 96 the definition
of "electronic communication" 97 does not likewise include the electronic
storage98 of an electronic communication. 99 The court deduced from this
87. Id. at 458.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Seeid at459.
92. See id.
at 459-60 (relying on the reasoning in Turk, and holding that the Secret Service did
93. See id.
not "intercept" the customers e-mail because its acquisition was not contemporaneous with the
transmission of those communications).
at 460-63.
94. See id.
95. Pikowsky, supranote 46, at 52 (2003); Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
96. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
97. The ECPA defines "electronic communication" as:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic
or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include
(A) any wire or oral communication; ...(D) electronic funds transfer information stored
by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and
transfer of funds.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
98. "Electronic storage" is defined as:
(A) Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof, and (B) any storage of such
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distinction that Congress did not intend for the law governing
interception to be applicable to electronic communications in electronic
storage. 0 0 The court's decision in Steve Jackson Games illustrates a
problem scholars have written about before: the greater protection of the
Wiretap Act applies solely to the interception of e-mail that is in
transmission, leaving e-mail in electronic storage with the lesser
protection afforded by the SCA.'O°
One student of the subject, Tatsuya Akamine, argues that the "mere
absence of the reference to 'electronic storage' does not necessarily
mean that it is excluded from the meaning of 'electronic
communication,"' but rather, he asserts that if the meaning of "electronic
communication" is broad enough to encompass "electronic storage," 10it2
would be superfluous to add the reference to "electronic storage."
Opposition to this statutory distinction prevailed in 2001 with the
passage of the PATRIOT Act, which amended the ECPA by eradicating
the statutory distinction between "wire communication" and "electronic

communication." 103

communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994).
99. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460-63.
100.
Critical to the issue before us is the fact that, unlike the definition of 'wire
communication,' the definition of 'electronic communication' does not include
electronic storage of such communications ....Congress's use of the word 'transfer' in
the definition of 'electronic communication,' and its omission in that definition of the
phrase 'any electronic storage of such communication' . . . reflects that Congress did not
intend for 'intercept' to apply to 'electronic communications' when those
communications are in 'electronic storage.'
Id. at 461-62.
101. See Pikowsky, supra note 46, at 53 (arguing that the statutory distinctions are arbitrary,
and that the intended recipient of an e-mail has the same privacy interest regardless of whether the
message is intercepted while in transit or in storage); cf Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law
after the PATRIOTAct: The Big Brother that Isn 't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 616-18 (2003) (claiming
a retrospective search for stored e-mail is usually less intrusive because many relevant messages
may have been deleted prior to the search).
102. See Akamine, supranote 73, at 552.
103. The PATRIOT Act removed the following italicized language, leaving the statute to read:
'wire communication' means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use
of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such
term includes any electronicstorage of such communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (emphasis indicating omission).
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C. Konop v. HawaiianAirlines, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc.' 04 "created a significant stir in the legal community when it
was released early in 2001 because the holding was contrary to the
traditional judicial interpretation of the ECPA which is that the Wiretap
Act does not protect communications while in electronic storage."' 0 5
Robert Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines ("Hawaiian"),
maintained a password-protected website, on which he posted bulletins
critical of his employer, its officers, and the incumbent union, none of
whom were permitted access to the site.10 6 He created a list of
individuals, mostly employees of Hawaiian, who were eligible to access
the website. 10 7 Konop required these individuals to log in with a user
name and password. 10 8 To obtain a password, eligible persons were
required to register and consent to a non-disclosure agreement.10 9 Other
terms and conditions clearly displayed on the sign-on page prohibited
members of either Hawaiian or union management from viewing the
website. 110
Hawaiian vice-president, James Davis, was able to gain access to
Konop's restricted website by obtaining passwords from two eligible
Hawaiian pilots, Gene Wong and James Gardner.111 The two pilots
freely provided their information when Davis asked for their permission
to access the website using their names.1 1 2 By signing on, Davis
accepted the terms and conditions of the website, despite the prohibition
against management access.1 13 Davis continued to view the website
under both pilots' identities for several months and also shared
information from the website with other management and union
employees. 114

104. 236 F.3d 1035, (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001), reargued302
F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003).
105. Thomas P. Ludwig, What Online Activity Does the Wiretap Act Protect? The Ninth
Circuit Holds that UnauthorizedAccess of a Secure Website Does Not Violate the Federal Wiretap

Act - Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 301,303 n.9 (2003).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Konop, 302 F.3d at 872.
See id.
Seeid.
Seeid. at 872-73.
Seeid at873.
See id
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Upon becoming aware of this unauthorized viewing, Konop filed
suit against Hawaiian in the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California, alleging that Hawaiian's unauthorized viewing and use of
his secure website violated both the Wiretap Act, as amended by Title I
of the ECPA, and the SCA. 115 The district court granted summary
judgment to Hawaiian
on those claims. 1 6 Konop then appealed to the
7
1
Ninth Circuit.
In its original opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that a narrow interpretation of the Wiretap Act,
limiting the term "intercept" to mean contemporaneous acquisition, was
not consistent with the purpose, language, or text of the ECPA. 1 8 The
court reasoned that because electronic storage is necessarily a part of the
entire communication process, the definition of "electronic
communication" impliedly covers electronic storage, even if not
specifically referenced.' 19 Although the Ninth Circuit attempted to fit its
opinion within the framework of legislative intent and precedent from its
own jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit, its conclusions were diametrically
opposed to those of the earlier cases,"2 which were consistent with the
first case to introduce the narrow interpretation of "intercept," United
States v. Turk.' 2' However, the Ninth Circuit avoided the implications of
Turk by arguing that because the ECPA had subsequently amended the
Wiretap Act, the Act's new structure and definition of "wire
communication" which included stored information did not harmonize
with the older, narrower definition of "intercept" in Turk. 22 This opinion
23 and the court subsequently filed a new
was withdrawn however,'
4
2
opinion in its place. 1
In their second opinion, the court affirmed the district court's
summary judgment ruling with regard to the Wiretap Act claim, but
reversed and remanded the SCA claim on a technicality.' 25 The court
115. See id.
116. Seeid.
117. Seeid.
118. Konop, 236 F.3d at 1043-44.
119. See id.
at 1045 (citing Akamine, supra note 73, at 561).
120. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that for the Wiretap
Act provisions to be violated as to electronic communications, contemporaneous acquisition is
necessary); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
121. See supra Part IV.A.
122. Konop, 236F.3dat 1043.
123. 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
124. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003).
125. Konop, 302 F.3d at 879-80.
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adopted a narrow definition of "interception" more in line with
precedent, requiring that acquisition be contemporaneous with the
transfer of the communication for a violation of the Wiretap Act. 2 6 The
court concluded that summary judgment on the Wiretap Act claim was
proper because Konop's website constituted a stored electronic
communication, which is not included in the Wiretap Act's definition of
"interception."'1 27 With regard to the SCA claim, the court held that
summary judgment was not appropriate because a question of fact
existed as to whether defendant's viewing of Konop's
website fell under
28
(c)(2).1
2701
§
of
exemption
authorization
the user
The Konop court noted that Congress had amended the Wiretap Act
to eliminate storage from the definition of wire communication, 129 such
that the textual distinction relied upon by the Steve Jackson Games court
no longer existed. 130 While the court could have interpreted Congress's
amendment to the Wiretap Act as affording stored communications the
greater protection of Title I, it chose not to. Rather, the court stated that
the purpose of the recent amendment was to reduce protection of
voicemail messages to the lower level of protection provided for other
electronically stored communications. 13 1 The court held that "Congress
essentially reinstated the pre-ECPA definition of "intercept"acquisition contemporaneous with transmission-with respect to wire
communications" by eliminating storage from the definition of wire
communication.
Therefore, under the court's interpretation, the
amendment under the PATRIOT
Act supported the analysis of Steve
133
Jackson Games and its progeny.
The Ninth Circuit went on to say that when Congress passed the
PATRIOT Act, that body was aware of the narrow definition courts had
given the term "intercept" with respect to electronic communications,
but chose not to change or modify that definition.' 34 To the contrary,
Congress modified the statute to make that definition applicable to

126. See id. at 878 (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998))
(holding that Congress's use of the word "transfer' and its omission of the term "electronic storage"
in the definition of electronic communication reflects Congress's intent that "intercept" not apply to
electronic communications while they are in electronic storage).
127. Konop, 302 F.3d at 879.
128. See id. at 880.
129. See PATRIOT Act § 209, 115 Stat. at 283.
130. Konop, 302 F.3d at 878.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
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voicemail messages as well. 35 Therefore, the court held,
"Congress... accepted and implicitly approved the judicial definition
of
' 36
'intercept' as acquisition contemporaneous with transmission.'
D.

United States v. Councilman

United States v. Councilman'37 is the most recent circuit court case
to wrestle with the contemporaneity problem. This author believes this
time the courts got it right. In Councilman, the defendant was charged
with conspiring to engage in conduct prohibited by certain provisions of
the Wiretap Act.138 The district court dismissed, 39 and the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal. 140 Defendant Councilman was the Vice
14 1
President of an online listing service for rare and out-of-print books.
As part of its member services, Councilman's company provided e-mail
addresses to certain book dealers. 42 The government charged that the
defendant had directed one of his employees to write a program that
intercepted and copied all incoming e-mails from Amazon.com to
subscriber dealers. 143 Allegedly, the defendant and other employees read
44
these messages seeking commercial advantage over their competition.
The operations took place entirely in the RAM and hard drive of the
company's computer. 145 Each of the e-mails in question was an
"electronic communication" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 146
Councilman was charged with conspiracy to intercept the electronic
communications,
intentional
disclosure
of the
intercepted
communications (in violation of § 251 l(1)(a)), using the contents of the
intercepted communications (in violation of § 251 1(1)(c)), and causing a
person to divulge the content of the communications, while in
transmission, to persons other than the addressees of the

135.

See id.

136. Id.
137. 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc granted,opinion withdrawn by, 385 F.3d 793
(lst Cir. 2004), rev'den banc by, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). The statute applicable here is the version immediately
prior to the October 26, 2001 amendment to the PATRIOT Act.
139. See United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass 2003).
140. See United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004) [hereinafter
Councilman 1].
141. Id. at 198.
142.

See id.

143. See id.
at 199.
144. See id.
145.

See id

146. See id at 199.
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communications (in violation of § 251 1(3)(a)). 147 The defendant moved
to dismiss the case, arguing that because the e-mails in question were in
"electronic storage" (as defined in § 2510(17)) they therefore could not
48
be intercepted as a matter of law.'
The government argued that the legislative history showed that if an
electronic communication is obtained while simultaneously in
transmission and in storage, interception occurs. 14 9 The communications
at issue were "electronic communications" as defined by the prePATRIOT Act definition of a "wire communication," under which
electronic storage of a communication was included. 150 However, in
defining "electronic communication," no similar statement was made.
Based on Congress's decision to recite such an explicit inclusion, 151 the
court held that electronic storage is not part of electronic
communication. 152 The First Circuit found the statute to be
unambiguous: Congress meant to give lesser protection to electronic
communications than to wire or oral communications. 153 Accordingly,
the district court's dismissal of the Wiretap Act
the court affirmed
4
violation.

15

The court relied on the reasoning set forth in Steve Jackson Games
and Konop. 15 5 Councilman I was the first case in which a circuit court
adopted Konop's view that Congress accepted and implicitly approved
the judicial definition of "intercept" as acquisition contemporaneous
with transmission, originating in Turk, and continuing through Steve
Jackson Games and its progeny.
In his dissent, Judge Lipez, who would later write the en banc
opinion reversing the First Circuit's original opinion, described the
transmission of e-mail messages in more detailed terms, and did not see
the impediment that the majority saw. 156 First, with regard to the
exclusion of "electronic storage" within the definition of "electronic
communication," he rejected the majority's use of the canon of
147. See id.
148. See id. at 200.
149. See id. at 203.
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1997).
151. See id. at § 2510(12) (1997).
152. See Councilman 1, 373 F.3d at 201 (relying on the following canon of construction:
"When Congress includes a particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
153. See id.
154. See id. at 204.
155. See id. at 202-03.
156. See id. at 204-05 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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construction.1 7 Second, Judge Lipez employed a different canon of
construction to argue that the absence of any mention of a
communication in electronic storage amongst the exceptions listed under
the definition of "electronic communication" indicates an exclusionary
Congressional intent.'5 8
On August 11, 2005 the First Circuit reversed its previous opinion
and held that Congress intended that the term "electronic
communication" be interpreted broadly and did not intend, by including
electronic storage within the definition of wire communications, to
thereby exclude electronic storage from the definition of electronic
communications. 159 The court further held that the term "electronic
communication" "includes transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to
the communication process, and hence that interception of16an
e-mail
0
message in such storage is an offense under the Wiretap Act.'
In an opinion that methodically unraveled the First Circuit's panel
opinion issued thirteen months earlier, Judge Lipez rejected the maxim
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,16 1 put forth by the defendant and
adopted previously. Instead the court found the maxim was "not
62
helpful," that it was merely a presumption capable of being rebutted.1
The court rebutted this presumption by pointing out "Congress knew
how to, and in fact did, explicity exclude four specific categories of
communications
from the
broad definition
of 'electronic
communication."",163 The court also finally clarified the ambiguity that
surounded the legislative history of the ECPA, as the court explained
"the purpose of the broad definition of electronic storage was to enlarge
privacy protections for stored data under the Wiretap Act, not to exclude
e-mail messages stored during transmission from those strong
protections."' 64 Once the court determined the term "electronic
communication" includes transient electronic storage, smashing the
distinction between "in transit" and "in storage," it easily and logically

157.
158.
159.

See id. at 209 (referring to its use as a "non-textual, inferential leap").
See id.
at 210.
See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Councilman

Il].
160. Id.
161. Also referred to as the Russello maxim or canon of construction: "Where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion." TRW v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001).
162. See Councilman11, 418 F.3d at 74.

163.

Id. at 75.

164.

Id. at 77.
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found that the defendant had intercepted the e-mails in question, in
violation of the Wiretap Act.
V.

A.

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE ECPA

The Konop Argument, that Congress Implicitly Approved the
JudicialDefinition of "Intercept" is Flawed

The claim that the reasoning in Konop is supported by 'the
PATRIOT Act's recent amendment to the ECPA, is unwarranted and

flawed. Such reliance is imprudent because "the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one."'165 Moreover, the argument that the amendment reinstated the preECPA

definition

of intercept-acquisition

contemporaneous

with

transmission-with respect to wire communications is flawed because it
rests on the supposition that Congress implicitly approved a judicial
definition of "intercept" requiring contemporaneity. "Such a belief

requires an assumption that Congress was aware of the narrow definition
courts had given the term "intercept" with respect to electronic
166
Courts have described the ECPA as caught up in a
communications."'
"4fog,'167 "convoluted,'' 68 "fraught with trip wires,"' 169 and "confusing
and uncertain."' 70 "Considering how muddy this jurisprudence is and
how each court starts its opinion by complaining about how convoluted
the area of law governing the ECPA is, how could Congress have

possibly become aware of a common judicial definition for intercept
with regard to any form of communication?"'

71

Perhaps the more

165. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 891 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.
dissenting) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117
(1980)).
166. Blackford, supra note 68, at 849.
167. Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
168. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
169. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543 (5th Cir. 1994).
170. Konop, 302 F.3d at 874.
171. See Blackford, supra note 68, at 849. The intersection of the ECPA and the SCA is a
"complex, often convoluted, area of the law." Id.(citing Smith, 155 F.3d at 1055); see also Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
Wiretap Act "is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity"). The difficulty is further
compounded by the fact that "the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the
World Wide Web." Konop, 302 F.3d at 874. "Courts are thus essentially confined to using an
existing statutory framework that is ill-suited for dealing with modem forms of web communication
and inappropriate for the purpose of administering justice." Blackford, supra note 68, at 823 n.17.
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important question, however, is whether such a common judicial
definition exists.172
The dissenting opinion in Konop highlighted some other difficulties
174
73
with the majority's decision. Citing a past Ninth Circuit decision,
the dissent pointed out that in determining whether a wire
communication has been intercepted, the court rejected a
contemporaneous transmission requirement.' 75 The dissent further
argued that this contradiction creates a massive loophole in the
electronic communications clause of the ECPA. 176 Additionally, most
electronic communications do not enjoy statutory protection under the
Ninth Circuit's reading of the ECPA, thereby providing a legal
77 basis for
warrantless electronic searches by federal law enforcement.1
It has been argued that information communicated to Internet users
from websites is not even protected under the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation. 178 While the Court used the plain-language definition of
"intercept" in its decision, 179 it failed to understand the essential nature
of how the Internet functions. 180 Information is communicated
electronically on the Internet through web pages, and the process of
loading a web page differs from a phone call, for example, which
communicates aural information at the moment of creation, through
wires. 18 1 When a user visits a specific Uniform Resource Locator
("URL"), the information contained on the web page is transmitted
contemporaneously to the user. 182 Each page load becomes its own
communication to the recipient. 183 Therefore, the contemporaneous

172. Blackford, supra note 68, at 849.
173. Konop, 302 F.3d at 886-87 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "stored
electronic communications" should not be exempt from the protections of the ECPA. Id.
174. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051, 1057 n.l 1.
175. Konop, 302 F.3d at 887 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058). Smith
held Turk's contemporaneity requirement had been "statutorily overruled," at least with respect to
wire communications, by the changes in the statute which brought stored wire communications
within its purview. See id.
176. Id.at888.
177. See id.
178. Matthew Hector, Comment, Privacy To Be PatchedIn Later. An Examination of the
Decline of Privacy Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 985, 995-96 (2003).
179. The Court turned to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to define "intercept":
"[T]o stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or course before arrival." Konop 302 F.3d at 878.
180. Hector, supra note 178, at 995.
181. See id.
182. See Surf the Web: How the Web Works, LEARNTHENET.COM, Jan. 3, 2005,
http://www.leamthenet.com/english/html/l3wworks.htm.
183.

See id
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communication resulting from
a page load can be intercepted within the
84
Ninth Circuit's definition.'
B. Councilman II Strengthens the Argument that Gmail Intercepts its
Users' E-mail in Violation of the Wiretap Act
Although there has been no litigation surrounding Gmail and its
practice of scanning e-mail in order to place relevant text advertisements
alongside the text of incoming e-mail messages, it is plausible that such
an issue may soon arise in the courts, especially if other e-mail providers
implement similar advertising techniques. 185 In the event that such a suit
was to be brought under the Wiretap Act, it would most likely fail in the
many jurisdictions that require that 86an e-mail message be intercepted
contemporaneously with its transfer. 1
A private right of action brought under the Wiretap Act, whether by
a Gmail user or third-party sender, would most likely be met with a
consent defense by Google. Google would claim the Gmail user
consented to Gmail's practice of scanning e-mail messages in order to
display relevant text advertisements. 87 After receiving the requisite
invitation from an existing Gmail user, one must create a Google
account in order to become a Gmail user. After filling out some
rudimentary information-giving one's name, and creating a desired
login name-the prospective user is presented with a button to press
labeled "I have read and agree to the Terms of Use. Create my
account.' ' 188 This button is simply preceded by the following language:
"By registering for the Gmail service, I represent and warrant that I (or,
if I am under 18, my legal guardian) understand and agree to the Gmail

184. Hector, supra note 178, at 996.
185. However, GEICO Insurance Company filed suit against Google in May or 2004 alleging
that Google's practice of showing advertisements for insurance companies when a routine search for
"GEICO" was performed amounted to trademark infringement. See Google and GEICO Enter Into
Settlement Over Advertising Dispute, INS. L. & LITIG. WKLY, Sept. 19, 2005, at 1. A judge declined
GEICO's request to prevent Google from using this technique. See id. Google uses the same
advertisements and technology on Gmail that it does on its search engine. GEICO and Google have
since settled out of court. The settlement means Google will not have to cease such advertising
tactics, but the specific terms of the settlement are being kept confidential by both companies.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1 st Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868
(9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000) (permitting an interception when "one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent").
188. Create a Google Account - Gmail (June 24, 2005) (on file with author).
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Terms of Use above .... ,,189 The prospective user is also provided with
links to the Terms of Use, Program Policy and Privacy Policy.' 90 This is
all very misleading, as clicking on the "Terms of Use" link actually
takes the prospective Gmail user to a generic Google "Terms of Service"
page, not the "Gmail Terms of Use" Page, which exists and may be
accessed after creating the account.1 91 Nothing on the "Terms of
Service" page refers to scanning the contents of e-mail messages,
relevant text advertisements or targeted advertisements. Clicking on the
"Program Policy" link prior to creating an account merely displays a
page that primarily refers to prohibited behavior. Finally, clicking on the
"Privacy Policy" link displays a page which discusses Google's privacy
policy in general and addresses such topics as data collection, cookies,
and information sharing, but again makes no mention of Gmail's
relevant text advertisements. Thus, the current Gmail registration
process is not structured to provide potential users with adequate notice
of, or a chance to agree to, the scanning of e-mail messages for content
or the placement of relevant text advertisements, at least not until after
the user has created a Google and Gmail account.
Once empowered with the elite status of "Gmail user," the user may
stumble upon the Gmail Terms of Use, which presumably, was
originally intended for his assent by clicking a small link at the very
bottom of his inbox. But who would do so immediately, after creating an
account, and presumably having visited the page? Once at the Gmail
Terms of Use page the user is immediately greeted with the following:
"Welcome to Gmail! Before you register for your Gmail account, you
must read and agree to these Gmail Terms of Use and the following
terms and conditions and policies, including any future amendments
(collectively, the 'Agreement')." '1 92 Oops, too late. 193 Continuing down
the page, Google states, "[i]f you do not accept and abide by this
Agreement, you may not use the Gmail service." 194 This sentence is
hollow and of no force since Google's registration process and the
opportunity for the user to manifest agreement was flawed at the outset,
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Compare Google Privacy Center, Google Terms of Service for Your Personal Use,
http://www.google.com/terms-of service.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005), with Gmail Terms of
Use, supra note 22.
192. Gmail Terms of Use, supra note 22.
193. This certainly creates confusion for the user, who having registered for Gmail has missed
his opportunity to explicitly agree to the Terms of Use, but now is not sure if he will be deemed to
have agreed to the Terms of Use by continuing to use the service.
194. Gmail Terms of Use, supra note 22.
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and because there is no way for the user to now indicate his agreement,
nor is there a means of enforcing the prohibition on the use of Gmail
following non-acceptance or non-adherence to the Agreement.
The two provisions in the Terms of Use relating to relevant text
advertisements are as follows:
1. Description of Service. Gmail is a free, search-based email
application from Google (the "Service"). You understand and agree
that the Service may include content-targeted ads or other related
information, as further described below and in the Gmail Privacy
Policy. In addition, you understand and agree that the Service is
provided on an AS IS and AS AVAILABLE basis. Google disclaims
all responsibility and liability for the availability, timeliness, security
or reliability of the Service. Google also reserves the right to modify,
suspend or discontinue the Service with or without notice at any time
and without any liability to you.

8. Advertisements. As consideration for using the Service, you agree
and understand that Google will display ads and other information
adjacent to and related to the content of your email. Gmail serves
relevant ads using a completely automated process that enables Google
to effectively target dynamically changing content, such as email. No
human will read the content of your email in order to target such
advertisements or other information without your consent, and no
information will be
email content or other personally identifiable
195
provided to advertisers as part of the Service.
The first paragraph refers to the inclusion of content-targeted ads
but does not specifically mention the means by which these ads are
delivered. Moving down, the eighth paragraph addresses the
advertisements specifically. The use of the term "completely automated
process" is vague. The Terms of Use accurately describe where the
advertisements will appear, but fails to explain how this "process"
works. Even if the user were to agree in principle to the inclusion of the
advertisements, Google does not fully explain that it is actually scanning
the contents of each and every one of the user's e-mail messages, each
and every time he opens them. Therefore, there is a strong argument that
there is an absence of consent by the Gmail user. Google provides a
flawed registration process that robs prospective users of the opportunity

195. Id.
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to give informed consent and manifest their agreement to the Terms of
Use purported to govern their Gmail account.
Regardless of any finding of consent or lack thereof, courts
following the reasoning originating from the Fifth Circuit in Steve
Jackson Games and employing a narrow definition of "intercept" would
refuse to find that Gmail intercepts its users e-mails while in transit, but
such a court might find that the e-mails are acquired while in storage, or
while simultaneously in transit and storage.196 A Gmail user may not
open a new e-mail for hours or even days after the e-mail has reached his
mailbox. Councilman II is the first case to break with Steve Jackson
Games and its progeny. However, in the thirteen months it took for the
First Circuit decide Councilman II, district courts in the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have decided similar questions of Wiretap Act interpretation
based upon Councilman I, which is now bad law.1 97 According to the
reasoning of Councilman I, while that e-mail message remains delivered
but unopened, it is both in transit and in a form of temporary electronic
storage on Gmail's servers.' 98 Councilman I held that this duality places
an unopened, post-transmission e-mail in storage outside of the scope of

196. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (1lth Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 1051 (2003) ("We hold that a contemporaneous interception-i.e., an acquisition during
'flight'-is required to implicate the Wiretap Act with respect to electronic communications.");
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1193
(2003) ("We therefore hold that for a website such as Konop's to be 'intercepted' in violation of the
Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage."); Fraser
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting the reasoning in Steve
Jackson Games as to the meaning of intercept under the Wiretap Act); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that seizure of stored but unread email messages was not an interception and citing with approval the lower court's requiring
interception to be contemporaneous with transmission). On the other hand, e-mail messages opened
by the Gmail user, stored, and viewed at a later time (at which time Gmail would re-scan the
message and once again match it with a relevant text advertisement) are beyond the purview of the
Wiretap Act. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635-38 (E.D. Pa. 2001),
affd on other grounds, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that e-mails taken from posttransmission storage are not in "electronic storage"); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 64-65 (1986) (noting
that opened e-mail messages stored on a server are protected under provisions relating to remote
computing services).
197. See United States v. Jones, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Utah 2005) (citing Councilman I for
the rule that in order to prove a violation of the Wiretap Act, the defendant would have to prove that
the e-mail messages were intercepted contemporaneously with their transmission); United States v.
Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that "if an electronic communication
which is in the process of transit, even if momentarily 'parked' in an electronic lot, can be acquired
without violating the Act ... it [is] difficult to conclude that the acquisition of internal computer
signals that constitute part of the process of preparinga message for transmission would violate the
Act").
198. See Councilman 1, 373 F.3d 197, 202-03 (pointing to the presence of the words "any
temporary, intermediate storage" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) as controlling).
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the Wiretap Act.' 99 Since unopened e-mail messages addressed to Gmail
users remain in temporary storage on Gmail's servers before they are
retrieved for the first time by the Gmail user, a court adopting this
reasoning would have to find that Gmail is not violating the Wiretap Act
when it scans its users e-mail in order to lace them with relevant text
advertisements. On the other hand, a court following Councilman II
could and should come to the opposite conclusion, that Gmail is
intercepting its user's e-mails, electronic communications in transient
electronic storage.
C.

Gmail is Protectedby the SCA 's Over-BroadElectronic
Communications Service ProviderException

18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) excepts from Title II seizures of e-mail
authorized "by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
'
communications service. ,,200
There is no circuit court case law
interpreting this exception. 2 0 The advent of Gmail's relevant text
advertisement technology has rendered this exception over-broad since
its effects are of a nature not contemplated by Congress in 1986. While
electronic communications service providers may need the ability to
access user's stored electronic communications for backup purposes,
maintenance of their own servers, or perhaps in order to provide benign
services to users such as spell-checking or virus protection software,
Gmail's relevant text advertisements are of a completely different
nature. The impetus behind the placement of these advertisements is
greed. Google generates the overwhelming majority of its annual
revenue through Internet advertising. 20 2 The only reason Google can
afford to provide so many free oversized two and a half gigabyte
mailboxes to Gmail's users is that Google is able to guarantee
companies that their advertising dollars will be spent on targeted
advertisements, and that there will be many targets to choose from.
Gmail offers massive storage space and encourages its users to "never
delete" their e-mails, thereby providing fodder for the relevant text
advertising scanning process. 20 3 Gmail is not only scanning users' e-mail

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
Sept. 10,

See idat 203.
18 U.S.C.§ 2701(c)(1) (2004).
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2003).
See REVOLUTIONMAGAZINE supra note 24.
See Welcome to Gmail: A Google Approach to Email, http://www.gmail.com (last visited
2005).
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messages contemporaneously with their transmission, but also every
time the Gmail user re-opens an e-mail. Each of these previously viewed
e-mails is in "electronic storage." Gmail continues to lure in prospective
users with the promise of bigger inboxes. Once they are users, the e-mail
service provider from the parent company whose motto is "Don't Be
Evil" exploits them for profit, comfortably shielded from the penalties of
the SCA by the statute's electronic communication service provider
exception.
VI.

A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTAL EFFECTS

ProposedStatutory Interpretationof the Wiretap Act: Moving Past
the Assumptions of Konop
Under the narrow reading of the Wiretap Act we adopt... very few
seizures of electronic communications from computers will constitute
'interceptions.' ... Therefore, unless some type of automatic routing
software is used ... interception of E-mail
20 4 within the prohibition of
[the Wiretap Act] is virtually impossible.

The dissenting opinions in Konop and Councilman I discuss the
problematic and conflicting interpretations of "intercept" as the term
*
205
applies to electronic communications.
By holding that Congress
implicitly approved the judicial definition of "intercept" as acquisition
*
contemporaneous with transmission, 206 the Ninth Circuit created a
paradigm in Konop that supports the same statutory distinction that has
troubled scholars for almost twenty years. Although the majority opinion
addresses the law prior to the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the issues
presented by this distinction will remain relevant for as long as cases like

Gmail is an experiment in a new kind of webmail, built on the idea that you should never
have to delete mail and you should always be able to find the message you want. The
key features are:

Don't throw anything away.
Over 2604.977204 megabytes (and counting) of free storage so you'll never need to
delete another message.
Id.
204. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11 th Cir. 2003).
205. Councilman 1, 373 F.3d at 204-19 (Lipez, J., dissenting); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
206. Konop, 302 F.3d at 878.
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Konop, Steiger, and Fraserare allowed to stand.20 7 The First Circuit's
decision in Councilman II is not only a fair interpretation of the ECPA,
but it makes practical sense. In similar cases arising in the future, the
other circuits should reevaluate their jurisprudence on the Wiretap Act's
contemporaneity requirement in light of Councilman II. The First
Circuit's interpretation of the statute must supplant those currently held
and promulgated in other circuits in order to conform to Congress's
intent and the reality of modem technology.
If the courts were to find electronic communications in temporary,
intermediate storage incident to the transfer of those communications
that may be intercepted contemporaneously with transmission, Gmail's
scanning of e-mail messages as they are opened in order to deliver
relevant text advertisements would most certainly violate the Wiretap
Act. While Google might adjust Gmail so that it only begins scanning
the second time the Gmail user views a particular e-mail message, this
practice may violate the SCA depending on the interpretation of the
electronic communications service provider exception. It is possible
Gmail would have to completely abandon the practice of scanning users'
e-mail messages.
B.

Statutory Amendment of the Wiretap Act

It will be up to Congress to step in and remedy the situation if the
courts refuse to follow Councilman II and fail to realize Gmail's
dramatic encroachment on Interet privacy rights authorized under a
narrow definition of "intercept." One solution is to amend the Wiretap
Act to create a uniform meaning of "interception" for both wire and
electronic communications.20 8 "If the current interpretations are applied,
20 9
the privacy rights of all Internet users will be severely compromised.,
To prevent this erosion of Internet privacy, Congress should amend the
pertinent statutes to specifically include unopened, post-transmission email messages in temporary storage within the list of communications
that may be intercepted.2 10 There would be no need to include all stored
207. Id. at 887-88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing the interception and investigation of
stored electronic information).
208. See Hector, supra note 178, at 1003; see also Konop, 302 F.3d at 887-88 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that this term's statutory meaning has not been firmly established by the
courts). Justice Reinhardt's dissent points out that the varying definitions of "interception" "have
rendered the intercept prohibition ...meaningless." Id. at 887.
209. Hector, supra note 178, at 1003.
2 10. Cf id. (arguing that "Congress should amend the pertinent statutes to specifically include
stored electronic and wire communications within the list of communications that can be
intercepted"). Since Councilman I, the House of Representatives has introduced bills that would
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electronic or wire communications within such a class of communication
that may be intercepted under the statute because the SCA would cover
e-mail messages a Gmail user views, stores, and views again.21'
However, unopened, post-transmission e-mail messages should not be
denied protection under the Wiretap Act simply because temporary
electronic storage is incident to their communication to the Gmail user.
This proposal is based on the argument that the electronic
communications process envisioned by the ECPA includes more than
mere "transmission"; it includes "transfer"-the entire process of
communication, from the e-mail message's point of origin to receipt by
its intended recipient.2 12 The new text could read as follows:
§ 2510. Definitions
As used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.]
(4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents
of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, including those in
any temporary, intermediate storage incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof, through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device.
The goal of this amendment would be to broaden the very narrow
judicial interpretation of "intercept" under the Wiretap Act. Even though
this amended definition of "intercept" would include some e-mail
messages in temporary electronic storage, it is still consistent with the
developing case law, because the unopened e-mail messages this
proposal seeks to cover under the Wiretap Act are still intercepted
contemporaneously with their transmission. Under this definition of
"intercept," Gmail would violate § 2511 (1)(a) of the Wiretap Act and be
subject to its penalties for scanning previously unread e-mail messages
contemporaneously with their first viewing by a Gmail user in order to
place relevant text advertisements next to the e-mail message.

extend the protection of the Wiretap Act to electronic communication in electronic storage. On July
22, 2004, Representatives Bartlett, Delahunt, Flake, and Inslee introduced the E-mail Privacy Act of
2004, H.R. 4956, 108th Cong. (2004), which would extend the protection of the Wiretap Act to
storage. See Protecting Your Privacy,
in electronic
electronic
communications
http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/privacy/tech_email.html (July 22, 2004). Another bill, H.R.
4977, was also introduced in 2004. Both bills, H.R. 4956 and 4977 have been introduced to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
211.

See Hector, supra note 178, at 1003.

212.

See Akamine, supra note 73, at 562-565 nn.207-08.
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B. ProposedStatutory Amendment of the SCA: Narrowing the
Electronic Communications Service ProviderException
Gmail's exploitation of its users must be stopped because Congress
did not anticipate the use of technology in this manner when they passed
the ECPA, and because there is no case law interpreting the statute.
Congress should address the need for an updated statute that
contemplates the use of relevant text advertisements. The amended SCA
could read:
§ 2701. Unlawful access to stored communications
(a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided;

(c) Exceptions. Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with
respect to conduct authorized(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service, so long as the conduct of the person or
entity does not confer a pecuniary benefit upon the electronic
communications service grossly disproportionate to the benefit
received by the user of that service;
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user; or
(3) in section 2703, 2704 or 2518 of this title [18 USCS § 2703,
2704, or 2518].
The addition of language prohibiting the electronic communications
service from engaging in conduct that monetarily benefits the service
places Gmail's conduct within the scope of the SCA while still granting
electronic communications services the access to perform the functions
and processes necessary to electronic communications. The "grossly
disproportionate" language would give courts flexibility to determine
whether a service provider has violated the statute on a case-by-case
basis, and would invite the courts to employ a simple test balancing the
benefits received by both user and service provider.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

As access to the Internet continues to burgeon, the number of
people communicating via stored electronic and wire communications
will continue to increase. 2 3 Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that
judicial interpretation of these protective statutes be consistent with the
legislative aim of protecting the privacy rights of those individuals
communicating electronically.
The introduction of Gmail and its relevant text advertisement
technology poses a large threat to the privacy of senders and recipients
of e-mail messages. Google is luring individuals to use their service with
the promise of bigger inboxes and powerful search capabilities, and then
exploiting those individuals. Gmail is harnessing the advertising revenue
potential deep within the billions of e-mail messages of its users as those
messages arrive and while those messages sit in storage on Gmail
servers. The courts have reduced the effectiveness of the Wiretap Act by
narrowly interpreting the word "intercept" and thereby expelling
unopened, post-transmission e-mails in storage outside of the scope of
the Wiretap Act and leaving them to be protected by the SCA, whose
electronic communications service provider exception is out of date and
so overbroad as to not protect e-mail messages sent to Gmail users.
Councilman II is a step in the right direction, and Should guide other
circuits in interpreting the Wiretap Act broadly to include unopened,
post-transmission e-mails in storage. Failing a change in judicial
interpretation, or a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court, Congress
should amend the Wiretap Act and the SCA in order to create a uniform
meaning of "interception" for both wire and electronic communications,
and to narrow the electronic communications service provider exception.
The time for these changes is now, before the placement of relevant text
advertisements becomes firmly entrenched as just another privacy
concession in the rapidly evolving sphere of e-mail communication.
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See Hector, supra note 178, at 1003.
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